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We study potential games with continuous player sets, a class of
games characterized by an externality symmetry condition.
Examples of these games include random matching games with
common  payoffs  and congestion games.  We offer a simple
description of equilibria which are locally stable under a broad
class of evolutionary dynamics, and prove that behavior
converges to Nash equilibrium from all initial conditions.  We
consider a subclass of potential games in which evolution  leads to
efficient play.  Finally, we show that the games studied here are
the limits of convergent sequences of the finite player potential
games studied by Monderer and Shapley [22].
JEL Classification Numbers:  C72, C73, D62, R41.–1–
1.  Introduction
Nash equilibrium is the cornerstone of non-cooperative game theory, providing
a necessary condition for stable behavior among rational agents.  Still, to justify the
prediction of Nash equilibrium play, one must explain how players arrive at a Nash
equilibrium; if equilibrium is not reached, the fact that it is self-sustaining becomes
moot.  This question has launched a search for procedures by which  players can
learn to play Nash equilibria, and for games in which such procedures are effective.
In this paper, we study potential games with continuous player sets, a class of
games in which a wide range of evolutionary  processes converge to Nash
equilibrium. We offer simple characterizations of all equilibria of these games and
of the equilibria which are locally stable under evolutionary dynamics.  We establish
the global convergence of solution trajectories to equilibria.  We describe a subclass
of potential games in which evolution leads to efficient play.  Finally, we
characterize the games studied here as the limiting case of the finite player potential
games of Monderer and Shapley [22].
Monderer and Shapley's [22] finite player potential games are games which admit
a potential function:  a real-valued  function  defined on the space of pure strategy
profiles such that the change in any player's payoffs from a unilateral deviation is
exactly matched by the change in potential.  It follows immediately that Nash
equilibria are the local maximizers of potential.  Moreover, since profitable
deviations increase potential, better reply adjustment processes lead to equilibrium
play.
There are many reasons why introducing a notion of potential games for infinite
populations is worthwhile.  The basic convergence results for potential games
concern myopic adjustment processes, which are most natural to study when the
number of players is large; since games with large, finite populations can be
cumbersome to analyze, infinite population models offer a convenient alternative.
Moreover, since most work in evolutionary game theory concerns such models, our
results on infinite player potential games allows us to connect this notion to a large
segment of the literature.  Most importantly, the infinite player model allows us to
base our analysis on calculus.  This allows us to find a simple, economically
meaningful condition which characterizes infinite player potential games.  It also
enables us to derive conditions under which evolution leads to efficient play; we do
not know of a finite player analogue of these efficiency results.
Formally, a game with continuous player sets is a potential  game if it admits a–2–
potential  function:  in this context, a real valued  function on the space of strategy
distributions whose gradient is the vector of payoff functions.  If payoffs are smooth,
an equivalent definition of potential games is that payoffs satisfy externality
symmetry:  that for any pair of strategies i and j, the effect of adding players choosing
strategy i on the payoffs of those choosing strategy j is equal to the effect of adding
players choosing strategy j on the payoffs of those choosing strategy i.  Examples of
games satisfying this property are random matching games in which all players in a
match receive the same payoff, and congestion games, a class of games used to
model congestion in networks.1
Externality symmetry guarantees that reasonable behavior adjustment processes
converge to Nash equilibria.  The class of processes we consider is defined by two
natural conditions.  The first, positive  correlation, requires that strategies' growth
rates be positively correlated with their payoffs.2  Positive correlation is the weakest
monotonicity condition used in the evolutionary literature.3  We show that all
dynamics which satisfy positive correlation ascend the potential function.  This
observation is the key to our convergence results.
While we are able to prove a number of results using positive correlation alone,
for others we must also be sure that players eventually take advantage of
opportunities to improve their payoffs.  Our second condition, noncomplacency,
formalizes this idea by requiring all rest points of the dynamics to be Nash
equilibria.
In finite player potential games, all equilibria are local maximizers of potential;
since better reply adjustment processes increase potential, all equilibria are locally
stable.  In infinite player settings, these statements are false.  We characterize Nash
equilibria as the states which satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions for a
maximizer of potential.  Thus, while all maximizers are equilibria, not all equilibria
are maximizers.  However, since dynamics satisfying positive correlation must
                                                
1 A  related  model of congestion is considered by Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten [1], who use a
potential function to characterize equilibrium and to establish conditions under which  equilibrium is
unique.  Rosenthal [27] defines finite player congestion games and uses a potential function argument to
establish the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
2   The condition we use is actually somewhat weaker than this – see Section 4.
3 Positive  correlation  is  satisfied by both the replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker [33]) and the
best response dynamics (Gilboa and Matsui [13], Matsui [20], Hofbauer [14]).  Nachbar  [25], Friedman
[11], Samuelson and Zhang [28], Swinkels [32], Ritzberger and Weibull  [25], and Hofbauer and Weibull
[17] study classes of dynamics whose members satisfy some basic evolutionary desiderata.  Of these, the
conditions considered by Friedman [11] and Swinkels [32] are both the weakest and the closest to the
condition considered here.–3–
ascend the potential function,  we are able to show that the states which locally
maximize potential are precisely those which are locally stable.  Thus, by restricting
attention to locally stable equilibria, we recover the link with the finite player
analysis.
A full evolutionary justification of Nash equilibrium  requires a global stability
result:  solution trajectories from all initial conditions must converge to a Nash
equilibrium.  Despite the presence of unstable equilibria, we are able to extend
Monderer and Shapley's [22] global convergence result to the infinite player setting:
all trajectories of dynamics satisfying positive correlation and noncomplacency lead
to Nash equilibria.
Our efficiency results concern potential games which are homogenous: that is, in
which each strategy's payoff function is a homogenous function of the same degree.
All random matching games with common payoffs are homogenous potential
games, as are congestion games in which all facilities (e.g., streets) are equally
sensitive to congestion.
 We  measure  efficiency  in  terms  of  the  aggregate payoffs earned by all players in
the game.  Together, homogeneity and externality symmetry imply that a player's
payoff to choosing a strategy is always proportional to the marginal impact of his
choice on aggregate payoffs.  Using this observation, we show that every
homogenous potential game has a homogenous potential function which is
proportional to aggregate payoffs.  We can therefore establish that evolution
increases aggregate payoffs, that locally stable equilibria are precisely those which are
locally efficient, and that unique equilibria are not only globally stable, but also
globally efficient.
While the results on behavior adjustment obtained by Monderer and Shapley
[22] are quite similar to those obtained here, the formal connections between the
finite and infinite player models are not obvious.  To draw comparisons, we restrict
attention to finite player potential games in which players are anonymous and
identical.  We find a simple representation for these games in terms of an extended
potential function, and use this representation to define a notion of convergence for
sequences of games whose populations grow without bound.  We  then prove that
the limits of such sequences are the infinite player potential games studied here.
The existence of this fundamental link between the two models renders the choice–4–
between them a matter of analytical convenience.4
 Building  on  work  of  Fisher  [10]  and  Kimura  [18],  Hofbauer and Sigmund [15, p.
240-241] consider single population potential games in a population genetics setting.
They show that the replicator dynamics must ascend potential,5 and observe that
homogenous potential functions are proportional to average payoffs.  We establish
these results for multipopulation  settings, and show that positive correlation alone
ensures that evolution increases potential.  Moreover, by introducing non-
complacency, a plausible requirement for economic models, we are able to establish
a number of stronger results, including global convergence to Nash equilibrium.
The existence of a potential function is a rather strong requirement; this may
lead one to question the practical relevance of our results.  However, in mechanism
design settings, one often assumes the presence of a social planner who is uncertain
about players' preferences, but is able to alter their payoffs using transfer payments.
Such a planner can use transfers to create a game which admits a potential function,
ensuring convergence to equilibrium play.  In Sandholm [30], we use this
observation as the basis for an evolutionary approach to implementation theory.
Section 2 defines potential games and introduces three classes of examples.
Section 3 characterizes equilibria.  Section 4 studies evolutionary dynamics.  Section
5 introduces homogenous potential games and investigates their efficiency
properties.  Finally, Section 6 establishes the connections  between the finite player
potential games of Monderer and Shapley [22] and the infinite player potential
games studied here.  Readers who are especially interested in these last results may
prefer to read Section 6 immediately following Section 2.
                                                
4 Monderer  and  Shapley  [22] propose the global maximizer of potential as an equilibrium selection
device.  A number of papers provide formal justifications for this idea.   Blume [3, 4, 5] shows that if
players are randomly matched to play a finite player potential game, then the global maximizer of
potential is the unique stochastically  stable outcome when mutation probabilities are determined via
the log-linear choice rule.  He also proves related results for local interaction models.  Hofbauer and
Sorger [16] consider populations of players who are randomly matched to play a game with common
payoffs.  They show that in perfect foresight equilibria (Matsui and Matsuyama [21]) of these games,
behavior converges to the global maximizer of the potential function of the random matching game.
5   In fact,  they  use  differential  geometry techniques of Shahshahani  [31] to prove that if the state
space is stretched appropriately, the replicator dynamics climb the potential function at a maximal
rate.–5–
2.  Potential Games
2.1  Population Games, Potential Games, and Externality Symmetry
A population game with r continuous populations of players is defined by a mass
and a strategy set for each population and a payoff function for each strategy.  The set
of populations is denoted P = {1, ... , r}, where r ³ 1; population p has mass    m
p.  The
set of strategies for population p is denoted    S
p = {1, ... ,    n




p å  equals the
total number of pure strategies.
The set of strategy distributions within population p Î P is denoted    X
p = {x Î
      R+
n
p
:     xi
p
i å  =    m
p}, while X = {x = (      x
1, ... ,    x
r) Î       R+
n:     x
p Î    X
p} is the set of overall
strategy distributions.  While behavior is always described by a point in X, it will be
useful to define payoffs on the set    X  = {x Î       R+
n:     m
p – e £    xi
p
i å  £    m
p + e  " p Î P},
where e is a positive constant.  The set    X  contains the strategy distributions which
can arise if each population's mass stays within e of    m
p.  Defining payoffs on this set
is useful because it enables us to speak of the marginal impact of a newcomer, but is
otherwise innocuous: versions of all of our results hold if payoffs are only defined
on X.
  The payoff function for strategy i Î    S
p is denoted    Fi
p:    X  ® R, and is assumed to
be continuous.  Note that the payoffs to a strategy in population p can depend on the
strategy distribution within population p itself.  We let    F
p:    X  ®       R
n
p
 refer to the
vector of payoff functions for strategies belonging to population p and let F:    X  ®       R
n
denote the vector of all payoff functions.  Similar notational conventions are used
throughout the paper.  However, when considering single population games, we
omit superscripts and assume that the population mass equals one.
We call F a potential game if condition (P) holds:
(P) There exists a       C




p (x) =    Fi
p(x)
for all x Î    X , i Î    S
p, and p Î P.
Condition  (P)  says  that there is a continuously differentiable function f whose
gradient,    Ñf , equals the payoff vector F.  The function f, which is unique up to an
additive constant, is called the potential function of the game.
For intuition, consider a state x Î X at which        Fi
p(x) >       Fj
p(x).  At such a state, a
player choosing strategy j would prefer to switch to strategy i.  But since 












p (x) =       Fi
p(x) –       Fj
p(x) > 0, this profitable strategy change leads to a marginal
increase in potential.  More generally, we show in Section 4 that the uphill
directions of the potential function include all those in which reasonable
adjustment processes might lead.  This property lies at the heart of our analysis.
We do not require payoff functions to be differentiable, but if they are we can
characterize potential games in a more intuitive fashion.  In particular, if payoffs are
      C











p  for all i Î    S
p, j Î    S
q, and p, q Î P.
Externality symmetry requires that the marginal effect of adding a player choosing
strategy i on the payoffs of players choosing strategy j is the same as the marginal
effect of adding a player choosing strategy j on the payoffs of players choosing
strategy i.  This symmetry property has striking implications for the evolution of
aggregate behavior.
2.2  Examples
2.2.2  Random Matching Games with Common Payoffs  
Most work in evolutionary game theory focuses on populations of players who
are randomly matched to play normal form games.  In this setting, externality
symmetry requires that the players in any random match all obtain the same
payoffs.
 An  r player normal form game is defined by a payoff function    U
p:       S
1 ´ … ´    S
r ®
R for each player p;    U
p(      i
1, … ,    i
r) is the payoff player p receives if pure strategy profile
(      i
1, … ,    i
r) is followed.  The game exhibits common payoffs if    U
p = U for all p:  that is,
if each pure strategy profile yields the same payoff for every player.6
                                                
6   These normal form games are potential games in the sense of Monderer and Shapley [22].  In fact, as
we observe in Section 6, Monderer and Shapley's games are precisely those whose payoffs take the form
U






p+1, … , i
r) is independent of i
p.  Since the A
p terms do not alter
players' incentives, our results on evolution continue to hold when players are randomly matched to
play these games.  However, our efficiency results, which are defined in terms of aggregate payoffs, do
not generalize to these games. –7–
    Most of the literature  considers a single population  which  is randomly  matched
to play a symmetric two player game:  one in which       S
1 =       S
2 and       U
1(i, j) =       U
2(j, i) for
all i and j.  The latter condition implies that a player's payoff only depends on his
strategy and that of his opponent, not on whether he is called player 1 or player 2.  If
a continuum  of players is randomly matched to play such a game, the (expected)
payoffs from a match are given by
  Fi(x) = 







 If  a  symmetric  two  player  game  exhibits  common payoffs,  its payoff matrix U is
symmetric:  U(i,  j) =       U
1(i,  j) =       U
2(j,  i) = U(j,  i). Hence, payoffs in the random













i .  The
potential function for this matching game is
f(x) = 




Uij x x ij
ij S S
(,)
(,) Î´ å .
  The discussion following condition (P) shows that profitable changes in behavior
must ascend the function f.  Since f(x) is equal to one-half of average payoffs at state
x, evolution leads to locally efficient states.
Analogous results hold in the multipopulation case, in which a separate
population of mass one is assigned to each role in the game.  If there are r
populations, the payoffs to strategy    i
p Î    S
p in the random matching game are
      Fx
i
p
p()  = 
        





















¹ å Õ .
If {   U
p}pÎP exhibits common payoffs,  then the matching game F admits the potential
function
f(x) = 
     
( ( ,..., ) )









11 Î´´ Î å Õ ,
which equals aggregate payoffs divided by r. 7
 While  the  games we have just described have linear and multilinear payoffs,
                                                
7  Versions of our stability and efficiency results still  hold if the payoffs to different players in the
underlying game are multiples of one another:  that is, if for all p Î P, U
p = k
pU for some k
p > 0.–8–
population games which are not based on random matching generally have non-
linear payoffs.  In such cases, externality symmetry does not reduce to commonality
of payoffs; when externality symmetry does hold, efficiency does not immediately
follow.  The next class of examples illustrates these points.
2.2.2  Congestion Games
Consider a collection of towns connected by a network of streets.  We associate
each of r pairs of home and work locations with a group of commuters who must
travel between them.  Each player chooses a route (i.e., a subset of the streets)
connecting home to work; his driving time depends upon the traffic on the streets
he has chosen.
A congestion model is a collection {P, 
  
m
p {} pÎP,       {S
p}pÎP, 






fÎF}.  P is a
set of one or more populations, one for each home/work location pair.  The finite
set F = 




p Î Î U U  contains all available streets.  We associate each strategy i Î    S
p
with a complete route    Fi
p connecting the home/work pair of population p.8
 Let     r
p(f) = {i Î    S
p:  f Î    Fi
p} denote the set of population p strategies which
require street f.  The utilization of street f Î F is the total mass of the players whose
strategies use that street:
      uf(x) = 




p p Î Î å å
rf ()
.
When a  player selects a route, he experiences the delays on each street in the
route.  The street costs, cf: R+ ® R, are continuous functions which report the delays
on a street as a function of its utilization.  The congestion game derived from a
congestion model is defined by its payoff functions:
   Fi
p(x) = –




In models of traffic flow, the cost functions cf are increasing; we can study settings
with positive externalities by using cf which are decreasing.
Since payoffs to the strategies in a congestion game are sums of street costs, the
payoffs to any pair of strategies are bound together by the streets used in common.
                                                
8   We  do  not  assume  any graph theoretic structure on the set F.  Hence, the congestion model is
applicable in settings in which the set of facilities used by the players does not possess such a structure.–9–
Increasing the proportion of players from population p using route i affects the
players taking route j Î    S
q through increased traffic on streets in    Fi
p ÇFj
q.  If street











q å .  An increase in the use of route j has an the same marginal effect on
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   Even  if  street  costs are not differentiable, we can verify directly that F is a
potential game by observing that
f(x) = 






is a potential function for F.  The discussion after condition (P) shows that profitable
deviations ascend this function.  However, the function f is typically not
proportional to aggregate payoffs, so evolution need not lead to efficient play.  In
Section 5, we show that if all streets are equally sensitive to congestion, efficient
behavior is ensured. 9
2.2.3  Two Strategy Games
 If  a  game  played by a single population has only two strategies, all strategy
distributions lie on a line.  Since continuous dynamics on a line are easy to analyze,
two strategy games are quite common in the evolutionary literature.  It is therefore
worth noting that these games are all potential games.  Given any continuous payoff
functions F1, F2: X ® R, a potential function satisfying condition (P) is given by10
f(x1, x2) = 
     
Fz zd z F zzd z
xx
1 0 2 0 11
12
(, ) ( ,) -+ - òò .
                                                
9 Monderer and Shapley  [22] establish an equivalence between finite player potential games and
Rosenthal's [27] finite player congestion games; Voorneveld et. al. [34] provide a simpler proof.  It is
easy to generate examples which show that this result does not extend to the infinite player setting.
The equivalence proofs rely on constructions in which the number of facilities  grows exponentially in
the population size; this growth persists under the symmetry conditions we impose in Section 6.  Thus,
when there are a continuum of players, these constructions cannot be used.
10  To fully satisfy condition (P), we must extend the payoff functions from X to    X by letting F1(x1, x2) =
F1(x1, 1 – x1) and F2(x1, x2) = F2(1 – x2, x2) for all (x1, x2) Î    X – X.  While  in the previous examples there
are natural interpretations of payoffs at points outside X, in the current example such payoffs have no
obvious interpretation.–10–
3.  Equilibrium
We begin our analysis of potential games by characterizing their Nash equilibria.
Let the best response correspondence, BR: X ® X, map each state x Î X to the set of
states whose supports consist entirely of best responses to x.  Letting    C
p(   x
p) = {i Î Sp:
xi > 0} denote the support of    x
p, we define    BR
p and BR by
   BR
p(x) = {   z
p Î    X
p:     C
p(   z
p) Ì  





BR(x) = {z Î X:     z
p Î    BR
p(x) " p Î P}.
A  Nash  equilibrium is a state whose support consists solely of best responses to
itself:  x Î BR(x).
We noted earlier that all profitable strategy revisions lead to increases in
potential.  This suggests that the Nash equilibria of the game are related to the local
maximizers of potential.  The Lagrangian for this maximization problem is
L(x, m, l) = f(x) + 

















p Î Î å å ,
so the Kuhn-Tucker first-order necessary conditions are
(KT1)
     
¶f
¶xi
p (x) =    m
p –    li
p,
(KT2)    li
pxi
p = 0,  and
(KT3)    li
p ³ 0
for all i Î    S
p and p Î P.  The Kuhn-Tucker conditions completely characterize the set
of Nash equilibria.
Proposition 3.1:  The state x Î X is a Nash equilibrium of the potential  game F if and
only if (x, m, l) satisfies (KT1), (KT2), and (KT3) for some l Î       R
n and m Î       R
r.
Proof:  If x is a Nash equilibrium of F, then since F(x) =    Ñf (x), the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are satisfied by x,    m
p =       maxj Fj
p(x), and    li
p =    m
p –    Fi
p(x).
Conversely, if (x, m, l) satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, then for every p Î P,
(KT1) and (KT2) imply that    Fi
p(x) = 





p x ()  =    m
p for all i Î       C
p(x
p).  Furthermore, (KT1)
and (KT3) imply that    Fj
p(x) =    m
p –    l j
p  £     m
p for all j  Î     S
p.  Hence,       C
p(x
p)  Ì
      argmaxj Fj
p(x), and so x is a Nash equilibrium of F.  n–11–
Observe that the multiplier    m
p equals the equilibrium payoffs in population p.
Since the set X satisfies constraint qualification, satisfaction of the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions is necessary but not sufficient for local maximization of potential.
Therefore, while all local maximizers of potential are equilibria, not all equilibria
locally maximize potential.  In contrast, in Monderer and Shapley's [22] finite player
games, the only equilibria are the local maximizers of potential.
For intuition, consider a single population of players who are randomly matched
to play the coordination game in Figure 1.  Whether the population is  finite or
infinite, (expected) payoffs in this game are given by F1(x1, x2) = x1 and F2(x1, x2) = x2.11  
Figure 1
If N (< ¥) players are matched to play this game, there are two equilibria in
which all players choose the same pure strategy, but there is no pure strategy
equilibrium corresponding to mixed equilibrium of the normal form game.  If
exactly       
N
2  players chose each strategy, then the payoffs to each are   
1
2 .  But if a player
switches strategies, he alters the distribution of strategies in the population by      
1
N  in
favor of the strategy he switches to; since the underlying game is a coordination
game, this deviation is profitable.  In contrast, a player in an infinite population
cannot change the distribution of strategies in the population; hence, an even split
of the population between the two strategies constitutes an equilibrium.
  Both the finite and infinite versions of this matching game are potential games.





2 (( ) ( ) ) xx + .  The
equilibria (1, 0) and (0, 1) are the maximizers of potential on the set X = {(x1, x2) Î       R+
2:
x1 + x2 = 1}; the equilibrium (  
1
2 ,   
1
2 ) minimizes  potential on this set, but still satisfies
                                                
11  In the finite population case, these are the payoffs which arise if players can be matched against
themselves; an analogous analysis would hold without self-matching.
1, 1 0, 0
1, 1 0, 0–12–
the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions for a maximum.12
Of course, if even slightly more than half of the players choose one strategy, that
strategy offers higher payoffs, so we would expect a population to move away from
the (  
1
2 ,   
1
2 ) equilibrium.  We show in the next section that under a broad class of
evolutionary  dynamics, the locally stable equilibria are precisely those which
maximize potential.  Thus, restricting attention to stable equilibria reestablishes the
connections between our results and those of Monderer and Shapley [22].
4.  Evolutionary Dynamics
Throughout  this section we use terminology which is standard in dynamical
systems and in evolutionary game theory.  Formal definitions omitted from the text
can be found in the Appendix.
4.1  Positive Correlation and Noncomplacency
Many papers in the evolutionary literature study behavior adjustment under
some fixed equation of motion, most often the replicator dynamics (Taylor and
Jonker [33]) or the best response dynamics (Gilboa and Matsui [13], Matsui [20],
Hofbauer [14]). Rather than restrict attention to one particular specification of the
dynamics, we instead establish results which hold for any dynamics within a broadly
defined class.
  Evolutionary dynamics are described by a vector field V: X ®       R
n which implicitly
defines an equation of motion      ˙ x = V(x).  We require V to satisfy Lipschitz continuity
(LC) and forward invariance (FI):
(LC) V is Lipschitz continuous.
(FI)       Vx i
p()  ³ 0 whenever    xi
p = 0, and 






Î å  = 0 for all p Î P.
These conditions guarantee the existence of unique solution trajectories which do
                                                
12 In  the  finite  player  matching game, the potential function is P
N(k1/N,  k2/N) =       å = a
k aN 0
1 (/ )  +
      å = b
k bN 0
2 (/ ) .  This is a rescaled, discrete approximation of f; the two pure equilibria maximize this
function.  For a formal treatment of the finite player model and its connections with the infinite player
model, see Section 6.–13–
not leave X.13
Our main condition on the dynamics is called positive correlation.
(PC) V(x) · F(x) = 






pÎP å  > 0 whenever V(x) ¹ 0.
To see why this condition is so named, observe that by condition (FI),






pÎP å = 
     

















Î Î Î å å å
 = 
     





      Cov V F
pp (,)  denotes the covariance between strategy growth rates and payoffs in
population  p.  Hence, condition (PC) holds if there is a positive correlation between
growth rates and payoffs in each population.  However, it only requires the
weighted sum of the covariances in each population to be positive.  The conditions
closest to positive correlation in the evolutionary game theory literature are those of
Friedman  [11]  and  Swinkels  [32],  who impose restrictions similar to positive
correlation on each population.14
Since F(x) =       Ñf(x), F(x) is the direction of steepest ascent of the potential function.
Hence, geometrically, positive correlation requires that whenever the population is
moving, it is moving uphill.  This observation underlies our main technical
lemma.  We call a       C
1 function f:  X  ®  R a global Lyapunov function for the
dynamical system      ˙ x = V(x) if for every solution trajectory {xt}t³0, (i)      
d
dt f(xt) ³ 0 for all t,
and (ii)      
d
dt f(xt) = 0 implies that V(xt) = 0.  Condition  (i) requires that the function f is
weakly increasing along all solution trajectories, while condition (ii) demands that f
is strictly increasing except at rest points of V.  Lemma 4.1 establishes that the
potential function is a global Lyapunov function under any dynamics satisfying
positive correlation, providing a powerful tool for characterizing evolution.
                                                
13  For a proof, see Ely and Sandholm [9].
14 Friedman  [11]  considers  weak  compatibility, which combines positive correlation within each
population  with extinction:     xi
p = 0 implies that       Vi
p(x) = 0.  Swinkels [32] studies myopic  adjustment
dynamics, which satisfy positive correlation within each population, but with a weak inequality
replacing the strict one and with the additional requirement that all Nash equilibria are rest points
(although this latter requirement is omitted in some of his results).  For other conditions on
evolutionary game dynamics which are stronger than positive correlation, see Nachbar [24], Samuelson
and Zhang [28], Ritzberger and Weibull [25], and Hofbauer and Weibull  [17].  See Weibull [35] for a
survey.–14–
Lemma 4.1:  If F is a potential game and V satisfies  (PC), then the potential function
of F is a global Lyapunov function for      ˙ x = V(x).
Proof:  Positive correlation implies that      
d
dt f(xt) =       Ñf(xt) ·      ˙ xt = F(xt) · V(xt) ³ 0 and
that V(xt) = 0 whenever      
d
dt f(xt) = 0.  n
Positive correlation restricts the dynamics at all states besides rest points.  Our
next condition, noncomplacency (NC), specifies which states can be rest points.
(NC) V(x) = 0 implies that x is a Nash equilibrium of F.
If a profitable deviation is available, one should expect some players to eventually
take advantage of this opportunity.  Noncomplacency formalizes this notion.
An example of dynamics satisfying all four conditions are the Brown-von
Neumann-Nash (BNN)  dynamics, introduced for symmetric zero-sum games by
Brown and von Neumann [6] and studied more recently by Berger and Hofbauer [2].
Let
   ki
p = 
     

















þ ï Î å
1 0
denote the excess payoff to strategy i relative to the average payoff in its population.
Then the BNN dynamics are defined by15















Proposition 4.2:  The BNN dynamics satisfy (LC), (FI), (PC), and (NC).
 Proof:  In the Appendix (or see Berger and Hofbauer [2]).
It is worth pointing  out that the replicator dynamics do not satisfy
                                                
15  An interpretation of the BNN dynamics is as follows:  During any short time interval, all players
in a population are equally likely to  switch strategies, and do so at a rate proportional to the sum of
the excess payoffs in the population.  Those who switch choose strategies with  above average payoffs,
choosing each with probability proportional to the strategy's excess payoff.–15–
noncomplacency:  these dynamics do not allow extinct strategies to resurface, and so
exhibit non-Nash rest points on the boundaries of the state space.  We feel that this
property of the replicator dynamics is unreasonable in most economic contexts.
However, as noncomplacency is not needed for all of our results, we will note
explicitly when it is required.16
4.2  Evolutionary Stability
Our first stability result compares the rest points of the dynamics V to the Nash
equilibria of the game F.  At a Nash equilibrium,  no agent can unilaterally improve
his payoffs.  Hence, escape from a Nash equilibrium violates positive correlation.
All Nash equilibria are therefore rest points.  Under the additional assumption of
noncomplacency, only Nash equilibria can be rest points under V.
Proposition 4.3:  (i) If V satisfies  (PC), all Nash equilibria of F are rest points of      ˙ x =
V(x).
 ( ii)  If V also satisfies (NC), Nash equilibria of  F  and rest points of       ˙ x = V(x)
coincide.
As the proof of this proposition does not depend on the existence of a potential
function, the result is valid for any population game.
Proof:  To prove part (i), let x be a Nash equilibrium of F, and let V be dynamics
satisfying positive correlation.  Suppose    D
p(x) is the set of strategies in    S
p that are in
decline at x:     D
p(x) = {i Î    S
p:     Vi
p(x) < 0}.  Then forward invariance and the definition
of equilibrium imply that    D
p(x) Ì    C
p(   x
p) Ì       argmaxj Fj
p(x).  But forward invariance




Î å  = 0; therefore, the inclusion implies that





Î å   £ 0.  Summing  over p, we see that 







Î Î å å   £ 0.
Positive correlation then implies that V(x) = 0.
 The  proof  of  part (ii) follows immediately from part (i) and the definition of
noncomplacency.  n
                                                
16   Since all violations of (NC) under the replicator dynamics occur on the boundary X, versions of our
results requiring both conditions hold under the replicator dynamics if attention is restricted to solution
trajectories which avoid the boundary of X.  The best response dynamics also fail to  satisfy all four of
our conditions:  they fail the Lipschitz continuity condition (LC).–16–
 Since  dynamics  satisfying  positive correlation ascend the potential function, it
seems plausible that connections between its local maximizers and the game's
locally stable equilibria exist.  These connections are established in Theorem 4.4.
There  are two main conditions used in evolutionary game theory to capture
local stability.  Roughly speaking, an equilibrium is Lyapunov stable if no small
change in behavior can lead the population away from the equilibrium.  The
stronger criterion of asymptotic  stability requires that in addition, the population
eventually returns to equilibrium.  Formal definitions of these criteria can be found
in the Appendix.
The statement of Theorem 4.4 requires three additional definitions.  A set A Ì X
is a local maximizer  set of the potential function  f if (i)  A is connected; (ii) f is
constant on A; and (iii) there exists a neighborhood B of A such that f(y) < f(x) for all
y Î B – A and x Î A.  Since f is continuous, all local maximizer sets are closed.
Moreover, Proposition 3.1 implies that all local maximizer sets consist entirely of
Nash equilibria.  We call a closed set isolated if there is a neighborhood of the set
containing no Nash equilibria outside the set.  Finally, set A  Ì  X is smoothly
connected  if for any points x and y in A there exists a continuous, piecewise
differentiable curve g contained in A whose endpoints are x and y.17
We now state our local stability result.
Theorem 4.4:  Let F be a potential game with potential function f.  Then:
 ( i)  If V satisfies  (PC), then any local maximizer set is Lyapunov stable.
(ii) If V also satisfies (NC), then
(a) Any isolated local maximizer set is a minimal asymptotically stable set;
(b) Any smoothly  connected, minimal  asymptotically  stable set is an isolated
  local maximizer set.
Proof:  In the Appendix.
Part (i) of the theorem tells us that under dynamics satisfying positive
correlation, all local maximizers of potential are Lyapunov stable:  small
perturbations in behavior are not enough to move the population away from these
sets.  Without noncomplacency we  cannot say  more:  since the population can
become stuck at non-Nash states, local maximizer sets need not be asymptotically
                                                
17 Smooth  connectedness is a slightly stronger property than connectedness.  For examples of sets
which are connected but not smoothly connected, see Munkres [23, p. 156-158].–17–
stable, and sets larger than local maximizers can be locally stable.  However, part (ii)
of the theorem shows that if we assume both positive correlation and
noncomplacency, the local maximizer sets and the asymptotically stable sets
coincide.
Local stability results are most important once a population reaches equilibrium,
as they establish whether we should expect the equilibrium to persist.  However,
they do not guarantee that equilibrium will ever be reached.  In general,
evolutionary  game dynamics can exhibit closed orbits and chaotic behavior, with
solution trajectories perpetually avoiding neighborhoods of rest points.18  When
this occurs, equilibrium prediction is obviously inappropriate, and characterizations
of local stability are of less interest.
Fortunately, we are able to establish that in potential games, convergence to
equilibrium is assured.  Let {xt}t³0 be the solution trajectory with initial condition x0.
The limit set of x0, w(x0), is the set of limit points of this solution trajectory:  w(x0) = {z
Î X:  
     
lim
k®¥xtk = z for some tk ® ¥}.
Theorem 4.5:  Let F be a potential game.  Then:
 ( i) If V satisfies (PC), each limit set w(x) is a closed, connected  set of rest points of
V.
 ( ii)  If V also satisfies (NC), these limit sets only contain Nash equilibria.
Proof:  Follows from Lemma 4.1, Proposition 4.3, and Lemma A.1 in the
Appendix.  n
The first claim of Theorem 4.5 establishes that under positive correlation,
solution trajectories starting from each initial condition must converge to rest
points:  closed orbits and chaotic behavior cannot occur.  If noncomplacency holds as
well, all of these limit points must be Nash equilibria.  This result fully justifies
Nash equilibrium prediction.
                                                
18  Examples of limit cycles under the replicator dynamics and under the best response dynamics can be
found in Weibull [35] and Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer [12], respectively.   Cowan [7] analyzes an
example in which fictitious play of a 3 x 3 game leads to chaotic behavior.–18–
5.  Efficiency
 Nash  equilibria  often  fail  to  be  social  optima:    because players do not consider
how their actions affect opponents' payoffs, equilibrium behavior is often
inefficient.  In homogenous potential games, individual and social payoffs are
perfectly aligned; for this reason, self-interested choices lead to efficient play.
5.1  Homogenous Potential Games
  A potential game F is homogenous of degree k if each of its payoff functions    F i
p:
   X  ® R is       C
1 and homogenous of degree k; we assume throughout that k ¹ –1.  We
will explain why this condition ensures efficient behavior after presenting Lemma
5.2 below; before doing so, we offer some examples.
5.1.1  Random Matching Games with Common Payoffs
We saw earlier that all random matching games with common payoffs are
potential games; in fact, all are homogenous potential games.  In the single
population case, the payoffs to each strategy are linear in the population state x:  Fi(x)
= 
     
Uijx j jS (,)
Î å 2 .  Therefore,  such games are homogenous of degree 1.  In the
multiple population case, the payoffs to population p's strategies are multilinear in
(      x
1, … ,       x
p-1,       x
p+1, … ,    x
r); such games are homogenous of degree r – 1.
5.1.2  Isoelastic Congestion Games
Recall that the payoffs of congestion games take the form    Fi
p(x) = 




p ff f (( ) )
F ,
where the functions cf represent the costs of using each street.  Let
hf(u) = 
     
u ¢ cf(u)
cf(u)
denote the cost elasticity of street f, which is well defined whenever cf(u) ¹ 0.  We
call a congestion game isoelastic with elasticity h if hf º h for all f Î F:  that is, if all
streets are equally sensitive to congestion at all levels of use.  This condition implies
homogeneity.–19–
Proposition 5.1:  Any isoelastic congestion game with elasticity h is a homogenous
potential game of degree h.
Proof:  Since the street costs are isoelastic functions with elasticity h, they must
take the form cf(u) =    af
h u , where the af are constants.  (Observe that h cannot be
negative, as this would force street costs to become infinite at u = 0.)  Since each uf is
linear in x, each payoff function    F i
p is a sum  of functions  which are homogenous of
degree  h  in x, and so is itself homogenous of degree h .  n
5.2  Evolution and Efficiency
  Lemma 5.2 provides the basis for our efficiency results.  We measure efficiency in
terms of aggregate payoffs    F:    X  ® R, defined by
   F(x) = 







Î Î å å .
Lemma 5.2:  If a potential game F is homogenous of degree k, the function      
1
1 k Fx + ()  is
a potential function for F.
Proof:  Externality symmetry and Euler's law imply that






1 + () () = 




















































p kF x F x + + () () () =    Fi
p(x).  n
To see why homogeneity leads to efficient play, consider the expression 
     
¶
¶xi
p Fx () ,
which represents the impact on aggregate payoffs of introducing a new player
choosing strategy i to the game.  We can split this impact into two terms:  the first,









¶ å å () , represents the effect that the new player has on the incumbent
population; the second,    Fi
p(x), represents the new player's own payoffs.  In
homogenous potential games, these two effects are precisely balanced:  the payoff a
player receives from choosing a strategy is directly proportional to the social impact
of his choice.  For this reason, self-interested behavior leads to desirable social–20–
outcomes.19
We saw in Section 4 that evolution always increases potential.  But in
homogenous potential games, potential measures aggregate payoffs.  Hence,
aggregate payoffs must increase over all evolutionary paths.20
Theorem 5.3:  If the potential game F  is  homogenous of  degree  k > –1 and  the
dynamics V  satisfy (PC), then  all solutions of      ˙ x = V(x)  satisfy       
d
dt F(xt)  ³ 0, with
equality only at rest points of V.  If k < –1, then solutions satisfy      
d
dt F(xt) £ 0.
Proof:  Follows from Lemmas 4.1 and 5.2.  n
Theorem  4.4 established connections between local maximizers of potential and
locally stable equilibria.  By introducing Lemma 5.2, we can link these states with the
locally efficient states:  those which locally maximize aggregate payoffs.
Theorem 5.4:  Let F be a potential game which is homogenous of degree k > –1.
 ( i) If V satisfies (PC), then all locally efficient states are locally stable.
 ( ii) If V also satisfies (NC), then all locally stable states are locally efficient.
Proof:  Follows from Theorem 4.4 and Lemma 5.2.  n
In general, homogeneity only ensures local stability:  for example, coordination
games with common payoffs admit multiple stable equilibria, but only those with
the highest payoffs are globally efficient.  However, if a game admits a unique
equilibrium, this situation cannot arise.  Theorem 5.5 shows that in homogenous
potential games, the existence of a unique equilibrium ensures both global stability
and global efficiency.
Theorem 5.5:  Let F be a potential game which is homogenous of  degree  k > –1.  If F
admits a  unique Nash equilibrium, this equilibrium is  globally efficient and is
                                                
19 We  note  that  homogeneity is not a complementarity condition.  For example, in congestion games
homogeneity is consistent both with positive externalities (i.e., decreasing facility costs), which lead
to multiple equilibria, and with negative externalities (increasing facility  costs), which generate
unique equilibria.  For an analysis of the latter case, see Corollary 5.6.
20  Fisher's [10] Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection, a basic result from population genetics, is
Theorem 5.3 specialized to single populations, the replicator dynamics, and linear payoffs.
  Theorem 5.3 also shows that in homogenous potential games with k < –1, evolution decreases social
efficiency.  In these games, individual and social incentives are perfectly misaligned.  However, note
that in random matching games with common payoffs, k ³ 1, while in isoelastic congestion games, k ³ 0.–21–
globally stable under all dynamics satisfying (PC) and (NC).
Proof:  Since the potential function f is continuous and the set X is compact, the
set argmaxxÎX f(x) is nonempty.  Proposition 3.1 implies that the unique equilibrium
of F must lie in this set.  Global efficiency then follows from Lemma 5.2, and global
stability from Theorem 4.5.  n
We conclude this section by applying our results from the last two sections to
congestion games.  To model traffic flows or other settings with negative
externalities using congestion games, one assumes that the cost functions cf(uf) are
increasing in the utilization levels uf.  This ensures uniqueness and global stability
of equilibrium.  If costs are also isoelastic, global efficiency is also guaranteed.21
Corollary 5.6:  Let F be a congestion game whose costs satisfy   ¢ cf > 0, and  suppose  that
V satisfies (PC) and (NC).  Then F  has a  unique, globally stable equilibrium.  If F is
also isoleastic,  this equilibrium is globally efficient.
  Proof:  Recall that the potential function of the congestion game F is f(x) =
     






0 F .  Since street costs are strictly increasing, it is easily verified that f
is strictly concave.  Thus, uniqueness of equilibrium follows from Proposition 3.1,
global stability from Theorem 4.5, and global efficiency from Theorem 5.5.  n
6.  Potential Games as Limits of Finite Player Games
In this final section, we establish connections between infinite population
potential games and the finite player potential games (FPP games) of Monderer and
Shapley [22].  We  prove that infinite population potential games are precisely the
limits of convergent sequences of FPP games in which the number of players
approaches infinity.  For notational convenience, we restrict attention to the case of
single population games; our results are easily extended to the multipopulation
case.
                                                
21 Beckmann,  McGuire, and Winsten [1] prove a uniqueness result for their congestion model using a
potential function argument.  Dafermos and Sparrow [8] use different techniques to prove a global
efficiency result for congestion games; their conditions on costs are somewhat stronger than those used in
Corollary 5.6.  Neither of these works proves evolutionary stability results.–22–
An  N player normal  form game is defined by a strategy set    S
a and a utility
function    U
a:    S
a





ba ¹ Õ  denote
the set of strategy profiles for a's opponents.  Following Monderer and Shapley [22],
we call a game a finite  player potential  game if there exists a potential function U:
   S
a
a Õ  ® R such that
      Uii Uii U ii U ii
a aa a aa aa aa (ˆ ,) ( ,) ( ˆ ,) ( ,)
-- - - -= -
for all       ˆ i
a,    i
a Î    S
a,    i
-a Î       S
–a, and a Î {1, …, N}.  That is, any unilateral deviation has
the same effect on both the deviator's payoffs and potential.  Thus, the potential
function serves as proxy for each player's payoff function when the strategies of his
opponents are held fixed.  It is easily verified that FPP games can be characterized as
the class of games which admit the representation
      Uii U ii Ai
aa a a a a a (, ) (, ) ( )
-- - =+ ,
where for each player a,    A
a is a function  from  opponents'  strategy profiles       S
–a to
the real line.
To make sense of the notion of a convergent sequence of FPP games, we restrict
attention to games in which players are identical and anonymous.  In particular, we
assume that all players share the same strategy set S and payoff functions {ui}iÎS, and
that the payoff and potential functions only condition on the population's aggregate
behavior.  We call FPP games which satisfy these requirements anonymous finite
player potential games (AFP games).
  Payoff functions of AFP games must take the form




where P denotes the potential function, x the current strategy distribution, and ei a
basis vector in       R
n.  The domains of the functions P, ui, and a are    X
N,    Xi
N, and    Xd
N,
respectively, where
   X
N = {x Î       R+
n: 
  
xj j å  = 1, and Nxj Î Z for all j Î S},
   Xi
N = {x Î    X
N:  xi ¹ 0}, and
   Xd
N = {x Î       R+
n: 
  
xj j å  =      
N
N
-1, and Nxj Î Z for all j Î S}.–23–
The set    X
N contains all possible strategy distributions when the population size is
N, while    Xi
N is the set of strategy distributions in which at least one player chooses
strategy i.  We call    Xd
N the set of diminished  strategy distributions; points in this set
represent distributions of strategies in a subpopulation with one absent player.
The connection between AFP games and infinite player potential games becomes
clearer if we represent the former in a slightly different way.  Without  loss of
generality, we can extend the domain of the potential function P from    X
N to    X
N È
   Xd
N by defining P(y) = –a(y) for all y Î    Xd
N.  We can then express payoffs as




In this representation, the extended potential function summarizes all information
about payoffs.  The payoff to a player choosing strategy i when the strategy
distribution is x is the difference between the values of the potential function at two




would arise if the player left the population.
   This suggests that in the infinite population limit, the payoffs to strategy i should
be related to the partial derivative of P with respect to i.  The first step in formalizing
this intuition  is to define a notion of convergence.  We say that a sequence of AFP
games 








  converges if there exists a       C
1 function P :     X   ®  R and a




0  such that





N Px P x Py P y -- - £    Kxy
N -
for all x and y  in    X
N È    Xd
N and all N.  In words:  for each N, we require the
difference between      
1
N
N P  and P to be a Lipschitz continuous function; the Lipschitz
constant     K
N must vanish as N grows large.
 To  understand  this  condition,  first  observe  that  in  the  finite  player  games,  the
potential functions have magnitudes of order N; for this reason, we consider the
rescaled potential functions      
1
N
N P .  Second, notice that potential  functions  are only
unique up to an additive constant.  Since    X  is bounded, condition (C) implies that
the functions      
1
N
N P (x) –    c
N º      
1
N
N P (x) – (     
1
N
N P (e1) – P(e1)) converge uniformly to P(x).
Finally, condition (C) requires that for each fixed N, the difference      
1
N
N P (x) – P(x)
varies little when x is changed by a small  amount;  the larger is N, the less the–24–
difference may vary.22
   If the  potential  functions  of  a  sequence  of  AFP games converge, their payoff
functions also converge.  Furthermore, the collection {{ui}iÎS,  P} defined by the
various limits is an infinite player potential game.  This is the content of our
convergence theorem.
Theorem 6.1:  Let 








 be a convergent  sequence  of AFP games with
limit potential function P.  Then
 (i) The sequences of payoff functions are uniformly convergent:  for each i
Î  S there exists a       C
0 function ui:    X  ® R such that
     






N ux u x
®¥ Î
-  = 0.
(ii) The limit payoff functions and potential function define an infinite player
potential game.  That is,
ui(x) =   
¶P
¶xi (x) for  all x Î    X  and i Î S.
Proof:  Fix i Î S and x Î    Xi
N.  By the Mean Value Theorem,






i () ( () ) -- () =
1 ¶
¶
for some       zi
N(x) on the linear segment connecting x and    x -
ei
N .  Therefore, equation
(C) implies that
     
ux x i
N P
xi () () -
¶
¶  = 
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x ii zx x (( ) ) ( ) -
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x ii zx x (( ) ) ( ) - .
Since    K
N vanishes, and since P is       C
1 on the compact set    X , we conclude that
     










¶  = 0.  n
                                                
22  For an example of a convergent sequence of AFP games, see the end of Section 3.–25–
By restricting attention to games in which players are anonymous and by
choosing an appropriate representation for these games, we are able to establish a
basic link between potential games with finite and infinite populations.  Theorem
6.1 shows that the condition which defines infinite population potential games is
the limiting version of the conditions defining AFP games.  Together with our
stability results, the convergence theorem shows that in settings in which players
are anonymous, the choice between the finite and infinite player models is a matter
of analytical convenience.
Appendix
A.1  Evolutionary Dynamics:  Definitions and Auxiliary Results
Most of the definitions we require are stated in Section 4; some definitions which
were omitted are provided here.  A neighborhood of a closed set A Ì X is a set which
is open relative to X and contains A.  A closed set A Ì X is Lyapunov  stable if every
neighborhood  B of A contains a neighborhood B' of  A such that every solution
trajectory starting in B' never leaves B.  In other words, solutions  starting at all
points sufficiently close to A always remain close to A.
 Let  {xt}t³0 denote the solution trajectory of      ˙ x = V(x) with initial condition x0.  The
limit set of x0, w(x0), is the set of accumulation points of this solution trajectory:
w(x0) = {z Î X:  
     
lim
k®¥xtk = z for some tk ® ¥}.  A closed set of A Ì X is asymptotically
stable if it is Lyapunov stable and there exists a neighborhood B of A such that w(x) Ì
A for all x Î B:  in other words, solutions starting from all points close enough to A
remain  nearby and eventually converge to A.  The existence of a global Lyapunov
function allows a strong characterization of the limit behavior of a dynamical
system, as the following lemma shows.  The lemma combines results found in
Losert and Akin [19, Proposition 1] and Robinson [26, Theorem 5.4.1].
Lemma A.1:  If f: X ® R is a global Lyapunov function for      ˙ x = V(x), then  each  limit
set w(x) is a non-empty, compact, and connected set  consisting entirely of rest  points
of V and upon which f is constant.
Global Lyapunov functions can also be used to establish Lyapunov stability.  The
following lemma follows from Theorem 6.4 of Weibull [35].–26–
Lemma A.2:  If f: X ® R is a global Lyapunov function for      ˙ x = V(x) and A is a local
maximizer set of f, then A is Lyapunov stable.
To prove asymptotic stability results, we need slightly stronger conditions.  We
call a       C
1 function f: X ® R a strict local Lyapunov function for the set A under      ˙ x =
V(x) if (i) A is a local maximizer  set of f, and (ii) there exists a neighborhood B of A
such that      
d
dt f(xt) > 0 whenever x Î B – A.  The existence of a strict local Lyapunov
function for the set A implies its asymptotic stability.  This result also follows from
Theorem 6.4 of Weibull [35].
Lemma A.3:  If  f:  X  ®  R  is a strict  local  Lyapunov function for A, then  A  is
asymptotically stable.
A.2  Proofs Omitted from the Text
Proof of Proposition 4.2:
We present the proof of the case in which there is a single population of mass
one; the proof of the general case is a straightforward extension.  It is easily verified
that (BNN) satisfies (LC) and (FI).  To check (PC), suppose that x is not a rest point of
(BNN):       ˙ x = V(x) ¹ 0.  It follows that ki > 0 for some strategy i Î       S
1.  Hence, letting       ˆ S =
{ i Î       S
1:  ki > 0}, we find that
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Î å  > 0.
Thus, property (PC) holds.
To establish (NC), suppose that x is not a Nash equilibrium.  Then there is a
strategy i Î       S
1 such that xi > 0 and Fi(x) < 
     
max
jS Î
1 Fj(x).  Let strategy h Î       S
1 satisfy Fh(x)
= 
     
max
jS Î
1 Fj(x).  Then it is clear that Fh(x) >       Fx () , and so kh > 0.  Thus, if xh = 0, then       ˙ xh
= kh > 0, so x is not a rest point.  On the other hand, if xh > 0, then since Fh(x) >       Fx () ,
there must be a strategy l Î       S
1 such that xl > 0 and Fl(x) <       Fx () .  But then kl = 0, and so
     ˙ xl < 0; hence, x is not a rest point.  This  establishes property (NC), completing the
proof.  n–27–
Proof of Theorem 4.3:
  Part (i) of the theorem  follows immediately  from Lemma  4.1 and Lemma A.2.
To prove part (ii)(a), let A be an isolated local maximizer  set.  Since A is isolated,
there is a neighborhood B of A such that all Nash equilibria in B are in A.  Hence,
noncomplacency implies that V(x) ¹ 0 for all x Î B – A, and so positive correlation
implies that      
d
dt f(xt) =       Fx Vx tt () () ×  > 0 whenever xt Î B – A.  Thus, f is a strict local
Lyapunov function for A.  Lemma A.3 then implies that A is asymptotically stable.
Moreover, since A consists entirely of Nash equilibria, noncomplacency implies that
no strict subset of A can be asymptotically stable; therefore, A is a minimal
asymptotically stable set.
To prove part (ii)(b), suppose that A is a minimal  asymptotically stable set which
is smoothly connected.  Let    ¢ A  be the set of points in A which are Nash equilibria.
Because A is asymptotically stable, there is a neighborhood B of A such that all
trajectories starting in B converge to A.  By Lemma A.1 and Proposition 4.3 (ii), the
limit sets of these trajectories must be contained in    ¢ A .  Therefore,    ¢ A  is non-empty
and asymptotically stable; it is closed by definition.  But since A is a minimal
asymptotically stable set, we conclude that A =    ¢ A .  Thus, the set A consists entirely
of Nash equilibria.
We continue with a lemma:
Lemma A.4:  The potential function f  is constant on any smoothly  connected set  of
Nash equilibria of F.
Proof:  Let A be a smoothly connected set of Nash equilibria of F, and let y and z
be elements of A.  Then there exists a piecewise smooth function    g: [0, 1] ® A Ì X
with g(0) = y and g(1) = z.  Since
f(z) – f(y) = 




g ò  = 
     
Ft t d t (( ) ) ( ) gg × ¢ () ò0
1
 = 
     
Ft t d t
pp
p (( ) )( ) ( ) gg × ¢ () ò å 0
1
,
it is sufficient to show that for each p Î P, the integrand       Ft t
pp (( ) )( ) ( ) gg × ¢  equals zero
at all points at which g is differentiable.
Fix p Î P, and let t be a point of differentiability of g.  Observe that if    g i
p(t) = 0,
then       (g i
p ¢ )( t) = 0; otherwise, the path g would leave X at time t.  On the other hand, if
   g i
p(t) ¹ 0, then since g(t) is a Nash equilibrium,     Fi
p(g(t)) =    m
p(g(t))  º 
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pp ( ( )) ( )'( ) gg × = 



























=       mg
p t (( ) ) (     
v
1 ·       (g
p ¢ )( t)),
where      
v
1 = (1, …  , 1).  But since g stays in X,      
v
1 ·       g
p t ()  º    m
p, so differentiating with
respect to t yields      
v
1 ·       (g
p ¢ )( t) = 0.  Therefore,       Ft t
pp (( ) )( ) ( ) gg × ¢  = 0.  o
Now let B be the basin of attraction for A described above.  By definition, B – A
contains no rest points, and hence (by Proposition 4.3 (i)) no Nash equilibria.  Hence,
A is isolated. By Lemma A.4, f takes a unique value on A.  Call this value c.  Let x0 be
an arbitrary point in B – A, and let {xt}t³0 be the solution trajectory starting from x0.
By the definition of B, w(x0) Ì A, so 
     
lim ( )
t t fx
®¥  = c.  Because f is a strict local Lyapunov
function for the set A, it follows that f(x0) < c.  Since A is connected and f is constant
on A, we conclude that A is a local maximizer set.  n
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